Renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia has sharply increased tensions across the Horn of
Africa, raising fears of a wider regional confrontation. Ethiopia has accused Eritrea, Sudan, and Egypt of supporting armed groups fighting its government, allegations the three countries have denied. Ethiopia and Eritrea have severed diplomatic relations, and Addis Ababa has now accused Eritrean forces of invading northern Ethiopia. Eritrea disputes the allegations surrounding its involvement. Relations between Ethiopia and Egypt have also deteriorated, with both countries expelling diplomats. The fighting is increasingly intersecting with longstanding disputes over the Nile, territorial boundaries, and Ethiopia’s search for access to the sea.
The fundamental problem in the region is that political and security considerations continue to dominate relations between neighboring countries, while economic opportunities receive far less attention. Rather than viewing one another as potential trading partners and sources of shared prosperity, governments often approach their relationships through political rivalry, territorial disputes, and competing strategic interests. Yet these countries have much to gain from economic cooperation. Their geographic proximity, resources, and markets could create opportunities for trade, investment, and development. Unfortunately, political differences continue to overshadow these opportunities, leaving the region vulnerable to recurring tensions and conflict.
But the same geography could produce a different kind of competition, one driven by economic interests rather than political rivalries. Ethiopia’s search for the sea is a good example. Ethiopia has been landlocked since Eritrea became independent in 1993. For a country of its size, population, and economic ambitions, dependence on neighboring states for maritime trade creates a real vulnerability.
Ethiopia does not necessarily need to own a coastline. What it needs is reliable access to several ports. It already has access through Djibouti, which handles most of its maritime trade, but depending so heavily on one route creates economic and security vulnerabilities. Port Sudan, Berbera, and ports in Somalia and Kenya offer potential alternatives. Eritrean ports could also become options under different political circumstances. Rather than viewing Ethiopia’s search for maritime access with suspicion or as a threat, neighboring countries could approach it as a business opportunity. They could compete to attract Ethiopian trade by offering better port services, lower costs, and more reliable transport connections.
The security risks of depending on one route should not be underestimated. Uganda’s
President Yoweri Museveni has repeatedly raised similar concerns about the vulnerability of landlocked countries. He has argued that access to the sea is essential for economic prosperity and strategic security, warning that disputes over maritime access could become sources of future conflict. His concerns demonstrate that Ethiopia’s problem is not unique. Landlocked countries need reliable access to international markets, and their economic security should not depend entirely on political relations with one neighbor.
Recent developments in Ethiopia provide an even clearer example. During the renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia, Tigrayan forces and their allies advanced into the Afar region, threatening the country’s main trade corridor to Djibouti. Although the route remained operational, the advance demonstrated how quickly an internal conflict could threaten Ethiopia’s economic lifeline. Federal forces subsequently regained important positions in Afar, but the episode exposed a vulnerability that military victories alone cannot eliminate. When most of a country’s international trade depends on one corridor, even the threat of disruption can become a source of strategic pressure. Developing alternative routes would therefore be more than an economic opportunity for Ethiopia. It would also strengthen its national security.
Having several reliable routes to the sea would reduce Ethiopia’s vulnerability to political tensions, armed conflict, and disruptions along any single corridor. If one route becomes unsafe or commercially unreliable, trade could be redirected through others. This would give Ethiopia greater flexibility, strengthen its bargaining position, and reduce the economic consequences of depending so heavily on one neighbor.
But the benefits could extend far beyond Ethiopia. When Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed speaks about his country’s need for access to the sea, neighboring countries could also consider the economic opportunities this presents. Rather than responding primarily with suspicion and concerns over territorial ambitions, they could compete to attract Ethiopian trade. Sudan could offer Port Sudan, Kenya could promote Mombasa and Lamu, while Djibouti could offer Berbera, and potentially Eritrean ports could compete through better services, lower costs, and more reliable infrastructure. Ethiopia’s large market could become a source of investment, employment, and revenue for several countries instead of a cause of regional confrontation.
This does not mean countries should sacrifice their national interests, but it offers another way to pursue them. A coastal country does not have to surrender territory or sovereignty to provide a landlocked neighbor with access to the sea. It can offer port services, transport connections, and commercial facilities in exchange for economic benefits. Ports generate revenue, trade supports transport and logistics businesses, and commercial corridors attract investment and create employment far beyond the ports themselves. A coastline can become more economically valuable when it serves markets beyond national borders.
Competition between ports could therefore encourage cooperation between countries.
When neighboring states benefit economically from serving Ethiopia’s trade, they gain a stronger interest in maintaining peaceful relations and reliable transport corridors. Disruptions would not only hurt Ethiopia but could also cost those countries valuable business. The more countries benefit from Ethiopia’s economic growth, the greater their incentive to preserve the stability that makes that growth possible.
The growing tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea illustrate why this approach deserves
consideration. Ethiopia regards its lack of direct maritime access as a strategic vulnerability, while Eritrea views Ethiopia’s ambitions in the Red Sea with concern for its sovereignty. The insecurity of one country can therefore reinforce the insecurity of the other. But consider a different calculation. If Assab could compete with Djibouti, Port Sudan, Berbera, and other regional ports for Ethiopian trade, Ethiopia’s economic growth could become an opportunity for Eritrea. At the same time, access to several alternatives would reduce Ethiopia’s dependence on any particular coastline. What is now viewed primarily as a security dispute could also become an opportunity for commercial cooperation, without either country surrendering its sovereignty.
Sudan offers another example. Relations between Sudan and Ethiopia have been strained by border disputes, the Nile question, and suspicions surrounding the conflicts affecting both countries. Yet Sudan possesses something Ethiopia needs: another potential route to international markets through Port Sudan. Ethiopia, in turn, offers Sudan access to a large market whose trade could support transport businesses, logistics services, infrastructure investment, and employment. Despite their political differences, the two countries have economic interests that could benefit from greater cooperation. A stable Ethiopia could generate valuable business for Sudan, while a stable Sudan could provide Ethiopia with another reliable commercial corridor. The same neighbors that view one another through security could change to see economic value in one another’s stability.
This points to a wider problem in the current regional crisis. The Horn of Africa does not suffer from a lack of connections. Its conflicts demonstrate how closely connected its countries already are. Armed groups, political instability, military alliances, and strategic rivalries cross borders with remarkable ease. The renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia, the deterioration of relations with Eritrea, and the tensions involving Sudan and Egypt show how internal conflicts can become entangled with wider regional disputes. Yet if insecurity can cross borders so easily, economic opportunities should be able to cross them too.
The principle extends beyond Ethiopia. Uganda, Rwanda, South Sudan, Zambia, and other landlocked African countries also depend on neighboring states for access to international markets. Coastal countries could increasingly view these neighbors as valuable customers whose trade they can compete to attract. Such competition could encourage investment in infrastructure, more efficient port services, and better transport connections. It could also give landlocked countries greater freedom to choose routes according to cost, reliability, and commercial efficiency rather than political necessity.
Economic interdependence can change the incentives surrounding conflict in the Horn of Africa and the region as awhile. When a neighboring government views instability across its border as a strategic opportunity, an internal conflict can become a regional confrontation. When that same neighbor has substantial economic interests across the border, instability also threatens its own revenues, investments, and commercial opportunities. A neighbor can become more valuable when stable and prosperous than when weak and divided. This does not eliminate political competition, but it can make cooperation more attractive and confrontation less likely.
That may be a more practical way of approaching African cooperation. It does not require countries to abandon their national interests, surrender sovereignty, or remove their borders. It requires them to recognize where their economic interests can overlap. Ethiopia does not necessarily need to own a coastline to strengthen its maritime security. It needs several reliable and commercially competitive routes to the sea. Its coastal neighbors, meanwhile, have opportunities to benefit from serving its large market.
Africa does not need less competition. It needs a different kind of competition, one in which the prosperity of a neighbor becomes an economic opportunity rather than a strategic threat.
